The STIG – A new SDI assessment method by Nushi, Bujar et al.
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2015, Vol.10, 55-83 
 
55 
 
The STIG – A new SDI assessment method.  
B. Nushi1, B. Van Loenen2, J. Crompvoets3 
 
1,2 TU Delft, Delft, The Netherlands, b.nushi@tudelft.nl ; b.vanloenen@tudelft.nl  
3  KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, joep.crompvoets@soc.kuleuven.be  
 
Abstract 
 
To stimulate the Spatial Data Infrastructures (SDI) development effectively and 
efficiently, it is key to assess the progress and benefits of the SDI. Currently, 
several SDI assessment methods exist. However, these are still in an infant stage 
and none of these appear to meet the requirements of practitioners. As a result, 
SDI decision makers are still without any guidance on the performance of their SDI. 
In the financial sector stress testing is commonly used to assess the sustainability 
and success of the system. This work presents an early stage of a longer research 
activity by introducing the subject, underlying concepts and proposing a projection 
of an assessment method from FI to SDI. While this work already identifies a key 
scenario to begin with, concrete realisations remain part of the future work.  Based 
on a review of the nature and concept of the SDI and Financial Infrastructure (FI) 
we conclude that the stress test methodology is likely to be an appealing alternative 
way of assessing SDIs. The Multi-factor Stress tests (Hypothetical and a Non-
systematic Subjective scenario model) are most promising as a basis for SDI 
assessment. A first draft of the Stress Test for Infrastructure of Geographic 
information is presented: the STIG. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of Spatial Data Infrastructures (SDIs) remains to require major 
investments. Worldwide around €120 million is spent each year on the 
management of online portals providing access to geo-information alone 
(Crompvoets, 2006). The investment requirements for an Infrastructure for Spatial 
Information in the European Community (INSPIRE) was estimated to vary from 
€202 to €273 million each year for each European Member State (INSPIRE, 2003). 
Given this expenditure and society’s interest in the effective and efficient use of 
public funds, it is very important that these SDI services and initiatives are 
assessed on their effectiveness and efficiency.  
Driven by different goals and interests, researchers have developed and applied 
several SDI assessment methods over the past decade. These assessment 
methods concentrate on one of the aspects of an SDI (such as cadastres, 
organisational aspects), are restricted by one region, describe SDI development in 
only a few countries, or are still conceptual in nature, leaving SDI practitioners with 
no support or guidance on the performance of their SDI.  
In other domains, stress testing is an accepted way of assessing the functionality 
of a system. The objective of a stress test is to understand the sensitivity of the 
portfolio to changes in various risk factors.  
Our work assesses the extent to which stress test methodologies can be 
supportive to developing a new SDI assessment method that can provide the 
required information on the performance of SDIs.  
The characteristics of SDIs and Financial Infrastructures (FI) are central to the 
presented work. If we can assume that FIs have comparable key components as 
SDIs and are, similar to SDIs, complex, multi-faceted, dynamic and constantly 
evolving (Grus et al., 2007), then the assessment methodology applied to FIs may 
also work for the assessment for an SDI. Assuming that the systems of SDI and FI 
may have a similar level of complexity also their assessment methods may be 
similar. 
This paper aims to develop a theoretical framework of stress testing for 
infrastructures of geographic information and presents the lessons learned from 
an implementation of the stress test in FIs. The research on this paper stands on 
an on-going PhD research project on the development of a sound foundation for 
an academic theoretical framework for the STIG, Stress Test for Infrastructure of 
Geographic information.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the theory behind 
the SDI and SDI assessment is portrayed while the FI is presented in Section 3. 
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The theory behind the stress testing and the implementation of the stress testing 
is explained in Section 4. Finally, the argumentation on the suitability of stress 
testing for SDI assessment and the description of the framework of the stress test 
in SDIs, STIG 1.0, can be found in Section 5. This paper ends with a conclusion 
and further research in Section 6.  
2. SDI AND SDI ASSESSMENT THEORY 
An SDI may be defined as a framework continuously facilitating the efficient and 
effective generation, dissemination and use of needed geographic information 
within a community or between communities (Van Loenen, 2006). Rajabifard et al. 
(2002) argue that an SDI is an infrastructure intended to create an environment 
that will enable a wide variety of users to access, retrieve and disseminate 
geographic information in an easy and secure way. According to Rajabifard et al. 
(2002), SDIs allow for the sharing of data enabling users to save resources, time 
and effort when trying to acquire new datasets by avoiding duplication of expenses 
associated with generation and maintenance of data and their integration with 
other datasets. An SDI is also an integrated, multi-leveled hierarchy of 
interconnected SDIs based on collaboration and partnerships among different 
stakeholders (Rajabifard et al., 2002). Many countries have developed SDIs to 
better manage and utilize their geographic information assets by taking a 
perspective that starts at a local level and proceeds through regional, national 
levels to the global level. Rajabifard et al. (2002) suggest that different categories 
of components can be formed based on the different nature of their interactions 
within the SDI framework. Considering the important and fundamental role 
between people and data as one category, the second can be considered the 
access network, policy and standards – the main technological components. The 
nature of the second category is very dynamic due to the rapidity with which 
technology develops and the need for mediation of rights, restrictions and 
responsibilities between people and data change (Rajabifard et al., 2002). 
An SDI encompasses the policies, access networks and data handling facilities 
(based on the available technologies), standards and human resources necessary 
for the effective collection, management, access, delivery and utilization of 
geographic information for a specific jurisdiction or community (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: SDI Components (Rajabifard et al., 2002) 
 
Access mechanism, network mechanism and response time were also identified 
as three main factors with respect to accessing networks. With respect to data, 
scale and resolution, content, capture (tools and mechanisms), access and 
analysis tools, database management and metadata were identified as important 
factors. This suggests that an integrated SDI cannot be composed of geographic 
information, value-added services and end-users alone, but instead involves other 
important issues regarding interoperability, policies and networks. From this 
perspective, anyone (e.g. data users through to producers) wishing to access 
datasets must make use of the technological components. According to Van 
Loenen (2006), the SDI includes the following components: Datasets, Institutional 
framework, Technology, Standards, Financial resources, and Human resources 
(Figure 2). 
Figure 2 – SDI Components (Van Loenen, 2006) 
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Van Loenen (2006) distinguishes two categories of datasets: framework datasets 
and thematic datasets. Framework datasets are commonly used as a base dataset 
for thematic mapping. Specific thematic datasets are added to the framework 
dataset. The collection, maintenance, dissemination and use of geographic 
information is organized by institutions and maybe is the most important aspect of 
an SDI. The coordination of SDI development and leadership at a national level 
through the institutional framework are prerequisites for the establishment and 
further development of an SDI (Van Loenen, 2006). Van Loenen further argues 
that policies do exist at every level of SDI development and at each level they are 
likely to reflect the needs of a specific community. As a result, the policies of 
countries in a same level of a geographic information infrastructure (GII) 
development may differ from, or even conflict with, each other. According to the 
author (Van Loenen, 2006), technology has allowed us to start thinking about the 
SDI concept. Technology allows us to collect information in a digital form, 
distributing it very quickly at almost no costs. The technology component is closely 
linked with the existence of standards (both in software and hardware). Additionally 
he states that one of most important aspect of information sharing and integration 
is standardization. Dataset and technology specifications should adhere to 
standards in order to assure the integration of information. About the availability of 
the financial resources Van Loenen argues that this is a critical condition for the 
development of an SDI. Building awareness and commitment among the 
stakeholders that control funding resources is very important. Awareness will lead 
to short term financial support and commitment to continuing sustainable funding. 
Regarding the last SDI component Van Loenen believes that human resources are 
a natural element of the SDI. In a process-based SDI strategy, human resources 
typically exist of experts involved in coordinating the SDI, bringing the information 
producers and user together, and promoting the concept within and outside the 
SDI sector.  
2.1. New SDI Model  
Taking in account the recent technological developments we believe that 
Rajabifard’s SDI model of people accessing data through SDI has to evolve. 
Having considered the core components of SDIs by Rajabifard et al. (2002) and 
Van Loenen (2006) we are considering the access network, policy and standards 
as the key SDI components. According to this view, users (people) wishing to 
access data must utilize the key components. In some cases an SDI user may 
access information as well as data. The processes have become increasingly 
transparent to data users, as more and more access is required to a simplified form 
of data (Information) rather than in its raw data form. The shift to this new presented 
SDI model of information access and use will require institutional mechanisms 
(Institutions) to support the availability and access to data through the information 
and technologies components. 
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The new modified SDI model with the two new components (institution and 
information) is presented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: New SDI Model & Components 
 
This new model will be implemented as a reference point in further research 
towards the new SDI assessment method.  
2.2. SDI Assessment Methods 
Most SDI researchers of the last decade have tried several SDI assessment 
methods. Some authors focused on the description of the SDI themselves (Onsrud, 
1998; Masser, 1999; Vandenbroucke and Janssen, 2008) while others paid more 
attention to the methodology (Steudler et al., 2003, Delgado-Fernandez et al., 2005; 
Kok and Van Loenen, 2005; Van Loenen, 2006; Rodriguez-Pabon, 2005; Grus et 
al., 2007).  
Grus et al. (2007) introduced the multi-view framework to assess SDIs (Figure 4). 
This framework acknowledges the difficult task of assessing SDIs due to their 
complex, multi-faceted, dynamic and constantly evolving nature, unclear 
objectives and poor knowledge about the implications of the current SDI-use and 
current demands. According to Grus et al. (2007) the essence of the multi view 
framework is that it accepts the multiple facets of an SDI and therefore accepts its 
complexity in terms of multiple definitions. Grus et al. (2007) explains that the 
framework is a combination of several SDI assessment approaches varying from 
assessing the organizational aspects of an SDI to SDI clearinghouse that focus on 
different aspects of the SDI (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Multi-view SDI Assessment Framework (Grus et al., 2007) 
 
Each approach uses several indicators to measure specific SDI aspects and treats 
SDIs from a different perspective but none of them assesses the robustness of 
SDIs. This collection of indicators could potentially be used to create an 
assessment approach to measure the realization of specific SDI goals (Grus et al., 
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2007). The multi-view SDI assessment framework can also be applied in a purpose 
driven way. For example, an SDI practitioner who is interested in an assessment 
of a specific SDI aspect can select those assessment approaches that fit best 
his/her purpose of the assessment. Nushi et al. (2012) attempted to mutually 
implement a blend of three assessment methods (SDI readiness Index by 
Delgado-Fernandez et al., 2005; INSPIRE State of Play by Vandenbroucke and 
Janssen, 2008 and the Maturity Matrix by Kok and Van Loenen, 2005) to assess 
the status of SDI implementation of Kosovo. This research showed that the 
developed blended assessment method has significant shortcomings: the blended 
method was not useful for the practitioners; gathering objective input was very 
difficult; results of the assessment are biased and can be influenced and the 
monitoring and reproduction of the results is difficult.  
Based on this overview of the SDI assessment landscape, there is a need for a 
new SDI assessment method, which is more extensive, comprehensive, user-
oriented, demand-driven, diverse and closely tied to explicit targets. The 
assessment methods applied to financial systems may be an option for the SDI 
assessment. Therefore the next section identifies and defines the main 
components that typically constitute a financial system. 
3. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
A financial system consists of institutional units and markets that interact, typically 
in a complex manner, for the purpose of mobilizing funds for investment, and 
providing facilities, including payment systems, for the financing of commercial 
activity (IMF, 2006). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) an 
institutional unit is an entity, such as a household, corporation, government agency, 
and so on, that is capable, in its own right, of owning assets, incurring liabilities, 
and engaging in economic activities and in transactions with other entities. The role 
of financial institutions within the system is primarily to intermediate between those 
that provide funds and those that need funds and typically involves transforming 
and managing risk. It can be assumed that financial markets provide a forum within 
which financial claims can be traded under established rules of conduct, and can 
facilitate the management and transformation of risk. 
3.1. Financial Infrastructure  
Financial Infrastructure (FI) is a core part of all financial systems. Financial 
Infrastructure, broadly defined, comprises the underlying foundation for a country’s 
financial system. It includes all institutions, information, technologies, rules and 
standards that enable financial intermediation (IFC, 2009). These key components 
are vital to facilitating greater access to finance, improving transparency and 
governance, as well as safeguarding financial stability in global financial markets. 
Poor financial infrastructure in many developing countries is a considerable 
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constraint upon financial institutions to expand their offering of financial services to 
the population and the economy (Worldbank, 2011). The quality of financial 
infrastructure determines the efficiency of intermediation, the ability of lenders to 
evaluate risk and of borrowers to obtain credit, insurance and other financial 
products at competitive terms (IFC, 2009). Credit bureaus, collateral registries, and 
payment, remittance and securities settlement systems are all vital parts of a 
country’s financial infrastructure (IFC, 2009). When financial infrastructure is 
available, efficient and reliable, the cost of financial intermediation decreases. 
Financial products and services become accessible to greater numbers of citizens 
and lenders and investors have greater confidence in their ability to evaluate and 
guard against risk (IFC, 2009). Bossone et al. (2003) find that in environments with 
a weak FI, banks and other financial institutions are declining some of their roles 
such as information gathering, monitoring and contract enforcement. As FI 
develops it promotes financial market growth and competition which leads to more 
efficient capital allocation and more options for consumers. Serres et al. (2006) 
use data from business expansion to demonstrate the relationship between 
elements of FI and financial development and growth. They also include legal and 
regulatory variables related to contract enforcement and bankruptcy, as well as 
measures of investor protection or corporate governance in their analysis. Serres 
et al. (2006) took a similar approach to Rajan and Zingales (1998) and evaluated 
whether firms that depend more on external finance are more prevalent in 
countries with better financial infrastructure. Their findings indicate that FI 
significantly impacts both value-added and productivity growth by increasing 
finance for these firms. Most countries with mature FI have depositories for 
securities immobilization, whereas for countries with less mature FI is this not the 
case. Wealthier countries with more developed capital markets also tend to have 
one depository for all types of securities, have shorter settlement cycles and are 
more likely to have a real-time interface with the payment system. Stern and 
Feldman (2004) argue that there seems to be a perception in financial sector that 
if a large banking organization were to get in trouble, the government would, under 
most circumstances, intervene to prevent its failure. This possibility of a 
government bailout is commonly referred to as the “too-big-to-fail” policy. The idea 
behind this belief is that, in general, policymakers will be inclined to bail out 
institutions which are considered to be of “systemic” importance; that is, institutions 
whose potential failure could threaten the stability of the entire FI. Based on this 
“too-big-to-fail” argument, we can introduce future hypothesis about the importance 
of a balanced system: A balanced system can benefit from mutual balance of 
components. No dominant component relative to others is desirable. 
3.2. Relation Between FI and SDI 
FIs like SDIs have a significant role in economic development and stability of a 
country or a system. The key components enabling FIs and SDIs to perform are 
similar (FI: standards, rules, IT systems and SDI: standards, policy, access 
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networks). For this research we will apply the following definition of a financial 
infrastructure: ‘The underlying foundation for the financial system including the 
institutions, information, technologies and rules and standards which enable 
financial intermediation’ (IFC, 2009). While viewing the core components of FI we 
suggest that components (similar to SDIs) can be formed based on the different 
nature of their interactions within the FI framework. The fundamental role between 
people and funds (information) as one category while as second category can be 
considered the main technological components like Standards, Rules and IT 
systems (together with the institutions which are facilitating the whole process). 
This implies that an integrated FI cannot be composed of funds and users alone, 
but instead involves other important issues regarding financial intermediation. To 
be able to compare a FI with an SDI we used the new SDI model represented in 
Figure 3 and adapted with the key elements of the FI (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: SDI and FI Components 
  
The core elements of a FI are similar to an SDI because both infrastructures have 
many different providers (institutions) involved, a vast amount of different users, 
use a range of the technological systems, there is a need for interaction between 
all stakeholders while each of them has its own agenda (interest), standards and 
rules are necessary and the strength of the infrastructure depends on the 
coherence of the individual parts. Additionally stress testing is very often used to 
assess complex financial systems or parts of it.  
4. STRESS TESTING  
Reliability engineers often test items under expected stress or even under 
accelerated stress in order to determine the operating life of the item or to 
determine modes of failure. Stress testing is to be compared with load testing 
although no clear boundary exists when an activity ceases to be a load test and 
becomes a stress test. Load testing is the process of putting demand on a system 
or device and measuring its response. Load testing is performed to determine a 
system’s behavior under both normal and anticipated peak load conditions. It helps 
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to identify the maximum operating capacity of an application as well as any 
bottlenecks and determine which element is causing degradation. Stress testing is 
when the load placed on the system is raised beyond normal usage patterns, in 
order to test the system's response at unusually high or peak loads.  
4.1. Types of Stress Testing 
There are essentially two types of stress tests: single factor and multifactor stress 
tests (MAS, 2003). As the name implies, only one risk factor is stressed in single-
factor stress tests while several risk factors (if not all) are stressed in multi-factor 
stress tests. The different types of stress tests are shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Types of Stress tests (Adapted from MAS, 2003) 
 
We discuss each of the different Stress tests briefly below. 
4.1.1. Single Factor Stress tests  
Single factor shocks are appropriate at the desk or frontline level when an expert 
would like to know the consequence of a large move in a single risk factor. However, 
when assessing exposure to stress events, a single factor shock is rarely 
appropriate and would probably suffer from implausibility because when a stressful 
event occurs; seldom does it affect one factor alone (MAS, 2003). Standardized 
single factor stress tests have been issued by various organizations and can be 
adopted off-the-shelf. Few examples of standardized single shock stress tests are: 
standardized yield curve shift, steepening and flattening of the yield curves by 
standardized moves, increase and decrease in equity index values by 
standardized % etc. The advantage of using standardized stress-tests is that they 
are easily understood and have ready acceptability among users. However, the 
problem with standardized stress-tests is that they sometimes lose their relevance 
(MAS, 2003). Often these tests have been ‘out stressed’ by subsequent episodes 
of extreme moves in the market. Subjective single factor stress tests can also 
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subjectively stress test any factor shock as well as its magnitude. This  is the 
practice of many banks. When factors are chosen subjectively, a risk manager 
should try to ensure that the magnitude of shock of each factor is plausible and 
relevant to the portfolio (MAS, 2003).  
4.1.2. Multi-factor Stress Tests 
Stressing one stress factor at a time may be appropriate at the desk level but single 
factor shocks by themselves, are not sufficient for a comprehensive stress testing 
program because actual stress events seldom affect one risk factor alone. Multi-
factor stress tests involve stressing several risk factors at the same time. There 
are two main streams of multiple-factor stress testing: historical and hypothetical 
stress testing. 
4.1.3. Historical Stress Testing  
Historical stress testing can be conducted by revaluing portfolios using values of 
risk factors that existed during historical stress events. Historical stress events 
have been occurring so often in the recent past that risk managers are likely to find 
at least a few episodes that are relevant to their portfolios. The challenge in using 
historical scenarios is to choose a scenario that is appropriate for the portfolio. An 
argument against historical scenarios is that since no crisis has resembled any of 
its predecessors, there is no point in conducting such tests, since they will most 
probably never occur again (MAS, 2003). 
4.1.4. Hypothetical Stress Testing 
Risk managers can also construct hypothetical scenarios when no historical 
scenarios match the special features of their portfolios or when they want to stress 
new combinations of risk factors. When several risk factors are stressed at the 
same time, care must be taken to ensure that no relevant risk factor is omitted and 
that the shocks applied to combinations of risk factors, collectively make sense and 
are plausible. Hypothetical scenarios can be constructed systematically or non-
systematically.  
Systematic scenarios  
A systematic search for stress scenarios tries to ensure that all relevant risk factors 
are appropriately changed in an economically consistent manner. Several new 
methodologies are being developed to construct scenarios systematically. Risk 
managers can assess these methodologies and adopt those that they think are 
most appropriate for their portfolios. Some systematic scenarios building 
techniques are described below.  
Kupiec (1998) has introduced a Correlation Matrix methodology where a few risk 
factors (which play major roles) are stressed and all the other peripheral factors 
are adjusted using historical volatilities and correlations. The stress losses 
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calculated using this method have the benefit of introducing an element of 
probability into stress-testing. However, several studies including Longin and 
Solnick (1999) have pointed out that correlations break down during crisis periods, 
which means that use of historical volatilities and correlations to adjust peripheral 
factors may not be appropriate except under special conditions. In the 
methodologies that we have seen so far, a stress-test is first constructed and the 
stress loss is then calculated.  
A different approach is to specify a threshold stress loss and then examine the 
scenarios that could cause losses in excess of the threshold. Breuer and Krenn 
(2000) use the Monte Carlo simulation to first calculate portfolio values in different 
scenarios and then identify those scenarios that result in losses greater than a 
certain threshold. The scenarios where the threshold is exceeded can then be 
examined to determine what movements in risk factors caused the extreme losses 
and then appropriate risk mitigation can be performed.  
The last methodology for systematically constructing scenarios is called Extreme 
Value Theory (EVT). Models that use variance-covariance methods assume that 
the probability distribution of portfolio changes is well approximated by a normal 
distribution. However, it has been found that actual returns distributions display a 
higher level of probability for extreme events than that supposed by the normal 
distribution. According to Longin (1999), this is the reason why the actual 
distributions are said to have 'fat tails'. EVT is a theory that models these fat tails 
and Longin (1999) explains how one might apply EVT to stress testing. All the 
above methods, as pointed out in Schachter (2000), in some way incorporate 
historical data into the stress test. This may make the stress-test lose plausibility 
because it is probable that in an actual stressful event, the risk factors will not 
behave as they did in the past. Nevertheless, as argued by Kupiec (1998), stress 
scenarios that use historical volatilities and correlations are more plausible than 
scenarios that ignore these correlations altogether. 
Non-systematic scenarios 
One of the methods of the non-systematic stress tests is 'Worst-off' Scenarios. This 
is a common method used to construct a hypothetical scenario. It combines the 
most adverse movements in different risk factors, at a certain time interval and then 
revaluates the portfolio using these adverse movements. This method completely 
ignores the correlation between risk factors and will most likely lead to implausible 
scenarios that are often of little relevance. However, this is one of the more 
common scenario building methods (often adopted by the financial sector). 
Another method is using Subjective Scenarios. In a subjective search for scenarios, 
risk factors are first chosen and then stressed on the basis of expert inputs 
including users, producers, data owners, management, consultants etc. (MAS, 
2003). The main problem with this approach is that despite the best efforts of 
experts, such subjective stress tests may omit some risk factors or miss specify 
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the correlation (MAS, 2003). There could be hundreds of risk factors and it is quite 
impossible to subjectively configure a correlation matrix for them.  
This last method uses a technique that ignores peripheral risk factors. Some 
institutions conduct stress tests by changing a few risk factors and leaving all the 
other relevant risk factors unchanged. Such Stress tests are likely to be unreliable 
and are similar to the 'worst-off' scenarios. The only difference is that in this case 
the risk manager chooses the magnitude of change in the stress factors whereas 
for worst-case scenarios the magnitude is the same as the worst historical change 
in a given time interval.  
4.2. Implementations of Stress Testing 
The term "stress" may have a more specific meaning in certain fields. In materials 
science, fatigue is the progressive and localized structural damage that occurs 
when a material is subjected to cyclic loading. This can be typically seen as a 
standardized single factor stress testing method. In software testing, a system 
stress test refers to tests that put a greater emphasis on robustness, availability, 
and error handling under a heavy load, rather than on what would be considered 
correct behaviour under normal circumstances. Software testing uses also typically 
standardized Single factor stress testing method. The Cardiac stress test is a test 
used in medicine and cardiology to measure the heart's ability to respond to 
external stress in a controlled clinical environment (ATS/ACCP, 2003). Cardiac 
testing also implements standardized single factor stress testing method. The 
Nuclear power reactors stress test is based on a common methodology and 
assesses both natural and man-made hazards (i.e. effects of airplane crashes and 
terrorist attacks). Nuclear power plant testing clearly implements the historical 
multi-factor stress testing method. 
4.3. Stress Testing in Financial Infrastructure 
Stressful events occurred recently with alarming regularity and their impact is still 
severe. In the recent years there have been several stress events, some examples 
of which are the Gulf War, the Asian Crisis, destabilization of Balkans, the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, the Arabic spring and most recently the political 
tensions in Ukraine. These events have had an impact on the stability of FIs. Stress 
testing has played an important role as a systematic methodology to financial 
institutions to help prepare for such financial crises caused by these stressful 
events. Stress testing of a FI is a form of testing that is used to determine the 
stability of a given system or entity (IMF, 2006). It involves testing beyond normal 
operational capacity, often to a breaking point, in order to observe the results. 
Reasons for performing the stress test can include: determining breaking points or 
safe usage limits; confirming intended specifications are being met; determining 
modes of failure (how exactly a system fails); testing stable operation of a system 
outside standard usage (IMF, 2006).  
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The Bank for International Settlement (BIS) committee on the global financial 
system (BCGFS, 2000) defines ’Stress testing' of a FI as ‘a generic term describing 
various techniques used by financial firms to gauge their potential vulnerability to 
exceptional but plausible events’. 
Financial risk is defined as the uncertainty of returns from a portfolio. Credit Risk, 
which is one of the most important financial risks, is defined as the risk of loss that 
arises when an obligor to a contract, fails to perform its obligations under the 
contract or when its ability to perform such obligations is impaired. The uncertainty 
of returns from a portfolio is directly or indirectly influenced by numerous variables, 
which are called risk factors. For example, the prime rate is one of the risk factors 
that influence the value of a loan or bond portfolio. Even a simple loan portfolio 
made up of a few loans, is likely to be influenced by numerous risk factors. One of 
the risk manager’s primary objectives is to measure the influence of each risk factor 
on the volatility of portfolio returns and to manage the composition of the portfolio 
so that the volatility of the portfolio’s returns is reduced. Further, the risk manager 
must also measure the influence of the risk factors on each other (MAS, 2003). As 
presented in Figure 7 the most used scenario building methods in FI are worst-off 
and subjective non-systematic methods.  
Figure 7: Stress tests method for FIs (Adapted from MAS, 2003) 
 
Disentangling the effects of multiple risk factors and quantifying the influence of 
each is a fairly complicated undertaking. There is a distinct difference in the 
behaviour of risk factors during normal business conditions and during stressful 
conditions such as financial crises. In ordinary business conditions the behaviour 
of risk factors is relatively easy to predict because their behaviour does not 
significantly change in the short to medium term. Therefore, future behaviour can 
be predicted, to an extent, from past performance. However, during stressful 
conditions, the behaviour of risk factors becomes far more unpredictable and past 
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behaviour offers little help in predicting the future. This is why risk managers are 
well-advised to adopt a two-pronged approach to risk management, where on the 
one hand they use various qualitative and quantitative techniques to measure risk 
in ordinary business conditions; while on the other hand, they use stress tests to 
quantify likely losses under stress conditions (MAS, 2003).  
Based on this we can conclude that the most used scenario building methods in FI 
are worst-off and subjective non-systematic methods.  
4.4. The Basel Core Principles 
The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (The Basel Core Principles) 
are the de facto minimum standard for sound prudential regulation and supervision 
of banks and banking systems (BIS, 2012). Originally issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision in 1997, countries use the Core Principles as 
a benchmark for assessing the quality of their supervisory systems and for 
identifying future work to achieve a baseline level of sound supervisory practices 
(BIS, 2012). In the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank uses the Core 
Principles to assess the effectiveness of countries’ banking supervisory systems 
and practices (BIS, 2012).  
The Core Principles define 29 principles that are needed for a supervisory system 
to be effective. Those principles are broadly categorized into two groups: the first 
group (principles 1 to 13) focus on powers, responsibilities and functions of 
supervisors, while the second group (principles 14 to 29) focus on prudential 
regulations and requirements for banks (BIS, 2012). Table 1 presents 29 Basel 
core principles.  
Table 1: The Basel Core Principles 
Nr Principle 
1  Responsibilities, objectives and powers  
2  Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for 
supervisors 
3  Cooperation and collaboration  
4  Permissible activities  
5  Licensing criteria  
6  Transfer of significant ownership  
7  Major acquisitions  
8  Supervisory approach  
9  Supervisory techniques and tools  
10  Supervisory reporting  
11  Corrective and sanctioning powers of supervisors  
12  Consolidated supervision  
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2015, Vol.10, 55-83 
 
71 
 
13  Home-host relationships  
14  Corporate governance  
15  Risk management process  
16  Capital adequacy  
17  Credit risk  
18  Problem assets, provisions, and reserves  
19  Concentration risk and large exposure limits  
20  Transactions with related parties  
21  Country and transfer risks  
22  Market risk  
23  Interest rate risk in the banking book  
24  Liquidity risk  
25  Operational risk  
26  Internal control and audit  
27  Financial reporting and external audit  
28  Disclosure and transparency  
29  Abuse of financial services   
To assess compliance with a Core Principle, this methodology proposes a set of 
essential and additional assessment criteria for each Core Principle (BIS, 2012). 
By default, for the purposes of grading, the essential criteria are the only elements 
on which to gauge full compliance with a Core Principle. The additional criteria are 
suggested best practices for countries with an existing bank infrastructure that wish 
to further improve. Going forward, countries will have the following three 
assessment options:  
1. Unless the country explicitly opts for any other option, compliance with the Core 
Principles will be assessed and graded only with reference to the essential 
criteria;  
2. A country may voluntarily choose to be assessed against the additional criteria, 
in order to identify areas in which it could enhance its regulation and 
supervision further and benefit from assessors’ commentary on how it could be 
achieved. However, compliance with the Core Principles will still be graded only 
with reference to the essential criteria; or  
3. To accommodate countries that further seek to attain best supervisory 
practices, a country may voluntarily choose to be assessed and graded against 
the additional criteria, in addition to the essential criteria. 
To explain the whole process we are taking an example of one principle in this 
case principle 22: Market risk. The definition of the principle 22 is: “The supervisor 
determines that banks have an adequate market risk management process that 
takes into account their risk appetite, risk profile, and market and macroeconomic 
conditions and the risk of a significant deterioration in market liquidity. This includes 
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prudent policies and processes to identify measure, evaluate, monitor, report and 
control or mitigate market risks on a timely basis”. The essential criteria are: 
1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to have appropriate market 
risk management processes that provide a comprehensive bank-wide view of 
market risk exposure. The supervisor determines that these processes are 
consistent with the risk appetite, risk profile, systemic importance and capital 
strength of the bank. Furthermore, they must take into account: market and 
macroeconomic conditions, the risk of a significant deterioration in market 
liquidity and clear articulation of the roles and responsibilities for identification, 
measuring, monitoring and control of market risk. 
2. The supervisor determines that bank strategies, policies and processes for the 
management of market risk have been approved by the banks’ Boards and that 
the Boards oversee management in a way that ensures that these policies and 
processes are implemented effectively and fully integrated into the banks’ 
overall risk management process. 
3. The supervisor determines that the bank’s policies and processes establish an 
appropriate and properly controlled market risk environment including: 
a. effective information systems for accurate and timely identification, aggregation, 
monitoring and reporting of market risk exposure to the bank’s Board and 
senior management; 
b. appropriate market risk limits consistent with the bank’s risk appetite, risk 
profile and capital strength, and with the management’s ability to manage 
market risk and which are understood by, and regularly communicated to, 
relevant staff;  
c. exception tracking and reporting processes that ensure prompt action at the 
appropriate level of the bank’s senior management or Board, where necessary; 
d. effective controls around the use of models to identify and measure market risk, 
and set limits; and 
e. sound policies and processes for allocation of exposures to the trading book. 
4. The supervisor determines that there are systems and controls to ensure that 
banks marked-to-market positions are revalued frequently. The supervisor also 
determines that all transactions are captured on a timely basis and that the 
valuation process uses consistent and prudent practices and reliable market 
data verified by a function independent of the relevant risk-taking business 
units (or, in the absence of market prices, internal or industry-accepted models). 
To the extent that the bank relies on modelling for the purposes of valuation, 
the bank is required to ensure that the model is validated by a function 
independent of the relevant risk-taking businesses units. The supervisor 
requires banks to establish and maintain policies and processes for considering 
valuation adjustments for positions that otherwise cannot be prudently valued, 
including concentrated, less liquid and stale positions. 
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5. The supervisor determines that banks hold appropriate levels of capital against 
unexpected losses and make appropriate valuation adjustments for 
uncertainties in determining the fair value of assets and liabilities. 
6. The supervisor requires banks to include market risk exposure into their stress 
testing programs for risk management purposes. 
Grading is not an exact science and the Core Principles can be met in different 
ways. The assessment criteria should not be seen as a checklist approach to 
compliance but as a qualitative exercise. Compliance with some criteria may be 
more critical for effectiveness of supervision, depending on the situation and 
circumstances in a given jurisdiction (BIS, 2012). Hence, the number of criteria 
complied with is not always an indication of the overall compliance rating for any 
given Principle. Emphasis should be placed on the commentary that should 
accompany each Principle grading, rather than on the grading itself. The primary 
goal of the exercise is not to apply a “grade” but rather to focus authorities on areas 
needing attention in order to set the stage for improvements and develop a plan of 
action that prioritizes the improvements needed to achieve full compliance with the 
Core Principles (BIS, 2012). For assessments of the Core Principles the following 
four-grade scale will be used: compliant (C), largely compliant (LC), materially non-
compliant (MNC) and non-compliant (NC). A “not applicable” (NA) grading can be 
used under certain circumstances where the supervisors are aware of the 
phenomenon and would be capable of taking action, but realistically there is no 
chance that the activities will grow sufficiently in volume to pose a risk. A brief 
description of grading and their applicability:  
 Compliant – A country will be considered compliant with a Principle when all 
essential criteria applicable for this country are met without any significant 
deficiencies.  
 Largely compliant – A country will be considered largely compliant with a 
Principle whenever only minor shortcomings are observed that do not raise any 
concerns about the authority’s ability and clear intent to achieve full compliance 
with the Principle within a prescribed period of time.  
 Materially non-compliant – A country will be considered materially non-
compliant with a Principle whenever there are severe shortcomings, despite 
the existence of formal rules, regulations and procedures, and there is 
evidence that supervision has clearly not been effective, that practical 
implementation is weak, or that the shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts 
about the authority’s ability to achieve compliance.  
 Non-compliant – A country will be considered non-compliant with a Principle 
whenever there has been no substantive implementation of the Principle, 
several essential criteria are not complied with or supervision is manifestly 
ineffective.  
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A stress test could be seen as a 'disaster exercise’ for the systemic banks or the 
entire FI. Systemic banks are banks that may not actually become insolvent 
because of their size. Should that happen, then it would constitute a direct risk to 
the financial system as a whole.  
Possible scenario can be outlined based on these events: sudden fall of the real-
estate prices, rising of the unemployment, the economy is stagnating, collapse of 
the financial markets or even countries cannot repay their debts. Banks should 
have at least 8% financial buffers reserved for these events so that national 
governments do not have to get involved in rescuing the banks by paying the 
financial buffers. The banks have to keep after the stress test more than 5.5% of 
their capital as a buffer. If a bank fails the stress test, it means that the capital 
buffers should be supplemented. A bank can supplement the capital buffers itself 
by trading certain organisational activities or by raising funds on the capital market. 
If this is insufficient, governments will get involved.  
5. DEVELOPING STRESS TESTING FOR SDI ASSESSMENT 
In section 3 we have found indications that justify research into the application of 
stress testing of a FI to the assessment of SDIs. Stress testing means choosing 
scenarios that are exceptional and plausible, and then putting them to a valuation 
model. The problem is that choosing stress test scenarios is, in its very nature, 
subjective. This makes an external review of a stress testing method extremely 
difficult (MAS, 2003).  
The SDI stress testing could alert SDI organizations to adverse unexpected 
outcomes related to a variety of risks and provides an indication of how much 
useful data might be accessed in the times of large risk impact. While stress tests 
provide an indication of the appropriate level of SDI necessary to endure 
deteriorating disaster conditions, an SDI structure alternatively may employ other 
actions to help mitigate increasing levels of risk. Stress testing as an SDI 
assessment method once implemented in the decision making process, can 
effectively increase the SDI system robustness. When implementing stress testing, 
challenges remain in modelling the interaction of different risk factors and their 
impacts; integrating stress testing at different levels; and how to make stress tests 
workable, realistic and timely. Having examined the various types of risk factors 
and methods to construct stress tests in section 4, we have chosen the Multi-factor 
Stress tests and among them the Hypothetical and a Non-systematic Subjective 
scenario model as often used in FI as the fundament for the STIG framework. This 
method first chooses and then stresses risk factors on the basis of expert inputs 
including users, producers, data owners, management, consultants etc. SDI 
practitioners can construct hypothetical scenarios when no historical scenarios 
match the special features of their situation or when they want to stress new 
combinations of risk factors.  
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Multi-factor shocks are appropriate when an SDI expert would like to know the 
consequences of large moves in a risk factor on the SDI. When several risk factors 
are stressed at the same time, care must be taken to ensure that no relevant risk 
factor is omitted and that the shocks applied to combinations of risk factors, 
collectively make sense and are plausible. The multi-factor approach being 
subjective stress-test may exclude some risk factors or misspecification of the 
correlation regardless of the best efforts by experts. Also due to the large number 
of risk factors it is quite unfeasible to subjectively configure a correlation matrix.  
Nevertheless, multi-factor tests can be used to investigate the sensitivity of an SDI 
to specific factors and to help identify and correct potential stress points. Therefore 
we suggest below the procedure for constructing a sound framework for The STIG 
model as represented in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: The STIG Framework 
 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 explain the steps that are required to establish the suggested 
framework. Section 5.3 addresses the scenario and related case study 
examination in more detail, while the estimation of the bottom line and the 
calculation of the stress failure are further discussed in Section 5.4. The suggested 
STIG framework will be reassessed after a first complete implementation, which is 
part of our future work (see also Section 6). 
 
5.1. The Process Towards the STIG Framework 
The process of implementing the STIG starts with the assessment of compliance. 
As a result, the STIG will allow the SDI authority to initiate a strategy to improve 
the SDI where necessary. The process towards the STIG framework consists of 
eight development steps: 
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1. Translating Basel principles to the SDI context. An assessment needs to 
be made about the applicability of the Basel Core Principles to the SDI 
context.  
2. Determining per SDI Core principle the assessment criteria and scores. 
Here, the assessment criteria per SDI Core principle and the scoring 
options will be developed.  
3. Defining scenarios. The scenarios have to be defined for each factor and 
the degree of the impact on the risk factors has to be decided.  
4. Case study examination. A case study will be conducted to identify likely 
stress events such as an industrial or nuclear disaster. The primary 
objective of STIG should be the identification of the nature and extent of 
any weaknesses in SDI compliance with individual Core SDI Principles, 
which will be defined in next phase of this research based on the Basel 
Core Principles.  
5. Assessing compliance with a Core SDI Principle.  To assess compliance 
with a Core SDI Principle, the STIG framework will also identify a set of 
essential and additional assessment criteria for each Core SDI Principle.  
6. Determining bottom line estimation. The STIG will be used to value the 
impact of a stress event on the SDI. The STIG assessment experts have to 
go through the statements of each factor and using their expertise, and 
estimate the bottom line of each stressful event occurring.  
7. Calculating the stress factor. Once the new bottom line for each factor has 
been estimated, the total stress failure, that the SDI is likely to acquire given 
the stressful event, is calculated.  
8. Reassessing the STIG.  The STIG must be refreshed systematically 
because the SDI environments are changing all the time. The STIG should 
be reviewed at least annually, if the portfolio or the environment changes 
significantly.  
5.2. Translating Basel Principles to the SDI Context  
The core principles may not all be applicable to the SDI context. For example, the 
principle 7 “Major acquisitions” addresses major acquisitions or investments by a 
bank, against prescribed criteria, including the establishment of cross-border 
operations, and confirming that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose 
the bank to undue risks or hinder effective supervision. In an SDI context such 
issues are unlikely to exist. Other principles, such as Principle 1 “Responsibilities, 
objectives and powers” addresses the operational independence, transparent 
processes, sound governance, adequate resources and accountability. This 
principle is very relevant in an SDI context. Therefore, we maintain this principle in 
the first STIG draft. Table 2 shows the principles, which we assess at this moment 
to be relevant to the SDI context. 
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Table 2: The Basel Core Principles: Applicability to SDI Context (draft) 
Nr Principle 
1  Responsibilities, objectives and powers  
2  Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for 
supervisors 
3  Cooperation and collaboration  
4  Permissible activities  
5  Licensing criteria  
6  Transfer of significant ownership  
7  Major acquisitions  
8  Supervisory approach  
9  Supervisory techniques and tools  
10  Supervisory reporting  
11  Corrective and sanctioning powers of supervisors  
12  Consolidated supervision  
13  Home-host relationships  
14  Corporate governance  
15  Risk management process  
16  Capital adequacy  
17  Credit risk  
18  Problem assets, provisions, and reserves  
19  Concentration risk and large exposure limits  
20  Transactions with related parties  
21  Country and transfer risks  
22  Market risk  
23  Interest rate risk in the banking book  
24  Liquidity risk  
25  Operational risk  
26  Internal control and audit  
27  Financial reporting and external audit  
28  Disclosure ad transparency  
29  Abuse of financial services   
* Principles likely to be implemented in STIG are emphasized in bold  
Step 2, determining the assessment criteria and score scenario per SDI Core 
principle, will build on the criteria developed in the Core Principles framework. We 
will start with these selected principles likely to be implemented in STIG and 
gradually tailor-make them by defining the criteria’s and values for SDI. 
5.3. Scenario Definition and Case Study Examination 
An example of a case study we may use is around the disaster at a chemical plant 
in Moerdijk, the Netherlands. This case study is carefully selected to assess the 
Dutch SDI as a first test of The STIG Assessment method. To predict similar results 
in means of a literal replication (Yin, 1994), we would apply the STIG method to 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2015, Vol.10, 55-83 
 
78 
 
assess the Dutch SDI from another perspective like Water management, Defence, 
and Urban Planning by using the same Moerdijk disaster scenario.  
The blast and fire completely destroyed the Chemie-Pack plant near the port of 
Rotterdam in January 2011. The fire started in the early afternoon sending a 
towering plume of thick smoke into the air and causing several powerful blasts, 
apparently as storage tanks exploded. The incident led to commotion about 
whether a cloud of smoke that crossed part of the country contained harmful 
substances and whether proper safety measures had been observed. A large area 
around Rotterdam was affected as the plume of potentially toxic smoke moved 
across several urban areas. Local authorities told residents to stay indoors. 
Authorities also closed off the nearby highway to traffic and warned local farmers 
to move livestock indoors so they did not eat soot (harmful black powder resulting 
from the incomplete combustion of hydrocarbons) falling from the smoke plume. 
Residents in parts of nearby cities were also warned to keep windows and doors 
shut, and boat traffic on the nearby waterway was halted. 
Figure 9: Scenario Fire in Moerdijk and Disaster Zone Around Rotterdam. 
  
These kinds of disasters can have a large impact on the society. Therefore the 
required information should be provided fast to the disaster managers and the 
emergency response team. It concerns information about the extent of the toxic 
plume, about who is present in the direct area of the disaster area and who needs 
to be evacuated, how these people will be informed and evacuated, via which 
routes and with what transportation means they can be evacuated, which 
transportation networks exist and can be used and where are the traffic jams due 
to hysteric population. 
5.4. Bottom Line Estimation and Stress Factor Calculation 
In the bottom line estimation the impact of a stress event on the SDI is determined. 
The STIG assessment experts have to go through the statements of each factor 
and using their expertise, and estimate the bottom line of the Moerdijk event. The 
experts may conclude that for Principle 1 the responsibilities were not clearly 
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determined and therefore this principle scores a non-compliant. This will be done 
for all SDI Core Principles. Once the new bottom line for each factor has been 
estimated, the total stress failure of the SDI for the Moerdijk event is calculated.  
6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this paper we assessed the extent to which stress test methodologies can be 
supportive to developing a new SDI assessment method that can provide the 
required information on the performance of SDIs.  
Based on a review of the Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI) and Financial 
Infrastructure (FI) we conclude that the stress test methodology is a promising 
approach for assessing SDIs.  
In the next phase of this research the Core SDI Principles will be defined based on 
the Basel Core Principles. Additionally, a set of essential and additional 
assessment criteria for each Core SDI Principle will be defined.  
From all the examined types of risk factors and methods to construct FI stress tests, 
the Multi-factor Stress tests (Hypothetical and a Non-systematic Subjective 
scenario model) are most promising as a basis for SDI assessment. This 
hypothetical scenario first chooses and then stresses risk factors on the basis of 
expert inputs including users, producers, data owners, management, consultants 
etc. SDI practitioners can construct hypothetical scenarios when no historical 
scenarios match the special features of their situation or when they want to stress 
new combinations of risk factors. 
Stress testing as an SDI assessment method once implemented in the decision 
making process, can effectively increase system robustness of an SDI. When 
implementing stress testing, challenges remain in modelling the interaction of 
different risk factors and their impacts. Such things as: integrating stress testing at 
different levels and making stress tests workable, realistic and timely remain 
complicated. These issues will be addressed in the research further developing the 
Stress Test for Infrastructure of Geographic information: the STIG. 
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